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Reforming Adult Felony Probation to Ease
Prison Overcrowding: An Overview of
California S.B. 678
Jessica Feinstein*
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, California’s prison overcrowding crisis made
national headlines.1 A panel of three federal judges ordered the
state to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity
within two years in order to conform with constitutional
requirements.2 Faced with the threat of releasing as many as
fifty thousand offenders into the community, lawmakers and
state officials rushed to devise plans that would satisfy the
federal mandate, while also preserving public safety.3
Yet, the specter of tens of thousands of offenders living in the
community is not a future scenario, but a present-day fact. As of
December 31, 2008, approximately 445,822 adults in California
were under “community supervision,” serving the remainder of a
state prison term on parole or having been directly sentenced to
probation.4 Roughly three-quarters of adults serving sentences
in the community5—or about three times the number of offenders
in California prisons at any one time6—are probationers. The
large number of individuals on probation is directly tied to the
state prison population: felony offenders who failed probation
supervision account for about forty percent of all new felony
* J.D. Stanford Law School, 2010; M. St. History of Art & Visual Culture,
University of Oxford, 2007.
1 Solomon Moore, Court Panel Orders California to Reduce Prison Population by
55,000 in 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A12.
2 Opinion and Order, at 130, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK
JFM P (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
3 Solomon Moore, Federal Judges Order California Prisons to Reduce Inmate
Population by a Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at A10.
4 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PROBATION AND
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, at 17 (2009) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus08.pdf.
5 Id. at 19.
6 As of December 31, 2008, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) reported a total prison population of 164,919. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR.
& REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT DECEMBER 31, 2008 (2009),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_
Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad0812.pdf.
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prison admissions each year,7 or roughly ten percent of yearly
total prison admissions.8
The prison crisis, accompanied by a crippling prison budget,9
an economic downturn, and an estimated $20 billion deficit,10
forced the California Legislature, after years of neglect, to turn
its attention to California’s adult probation population.11 This
extraordinary political moment opened the door for the 2009
passage of S.B. 678, the Community Corrections Performance
Incentives Act (CCPIA),12 which provides stable funding for
county probation departments to implement evidence-based
community corrections programs.13
This article provides a holistic examination of the CCPIA,
including an overview of the current state of California’s
dysfunctional adult probation system, the political maneuvering
which led to the passage of S.B. 678, and the challenges facing its
successful implementation. In particular, California’s own failed
reform efforts, comprehensive analyses of probation in California,
and other states’ probation legislation provide insight into the
inadequacies of California’s adult probation system and how the
CCPIA seeks to address these inadequacies.
Part I of this article discusses adult probation as it currently
exists in California, including the demographics, governance
structure, and funding apparatus. Part II details California’s
prior attempts to fix adult probation, best practices as they are
currently recognized, as well as new legislation conforming to
those best practices in Arizona and Kansas. Part III explores the
legislative history of California’s S.B. 678 and explicates the

7 MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, ACHIEVING BETTER OUTCOMES
ADULT PROBATION 20 (2009) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE], available
at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/Probation/probation_052909.pdf.
8 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., EXPERT PANEL ON ADULT OFFENDER AND
RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAMMING 24 tbl.3 (2007) [hereinafter EXPERT PANEL],
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/2007_Press_Releases/docs/ExpertPanelRpt.pdf.
Total annual prison admissions include parole violators as well as new felony convictions
from the courts.
9 The 2009–2010 CDCR Budget is approximately $8.2 billion, and has replaced
California’s university system as the largest state expenditure. Joan Petersilia, A
Retrospective View of Corrections Reform in the Schwarzenegger Administration, 22 FED.
SENT’G REP. 148, 149 (2010).
10 Shane Goldmacher, State Lawmakers Pass Proposal to Cut Budget Deficit by $1.1
Billion, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2010, 11:36 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/
03/state-senators-budget-deficit.html.
11 See Roger K. Warren, Probation Reform in California: Senate Bill 678, 22 FED.
SENT’G REP. 186, 186 (2010).
12 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1228–1233.8 (2010).
13 See § 1230; ROGER K. WARREN, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, PERFORMANCE
INCENTIVE FUNDING: CALIFORNIA SB 678 (2010), available at http://www.alec.org/AM/
PDF/publicsafety&elections/warren.pdf.
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provisions included in the new CCPIA. Finally, Part IV looks at
the next steps for the CCPIA, including a discussion of the
logistics of how various counties are implementing the act, and
potential challenges that the CCPIA faces going forward. While
the CCPIA could successfully realign the formerly adverse
incentives that the decentralized probation system has created,
implementation poses significant challenges for the translation of
theory into practice. Should implementation prove successful,
the CCPIA will mark a significant shift in how California uses
adult probation—from an under-resourced catch-all for repeat
offenders, to a front-end partner in the justice system.
I. PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA
In its current state, adult probation in California is a broken
system.
The dismal condition of probation is not a new
phenomenon. For years, county probation departments have
struggled with piecemeal funding and decentralized standards
and resources.14 Reports cataloguing the shortcomings of the
probation system—if in fact it can be called a “system” at all,
since that implies unified structure and central management—
and calling for reform have appeared with some regularity since
1990.15 These reports and a failed legislative attempt at reform
in 1994 will be discussed in greater detail in Part III. However,
for a brief summary of the current quality of California’s
probation services, it is enough to quote the 2003 Final Report of
the Probation Services Task Force: “[T]he status quo in the
probation system is not acceptable. . . . [T]he probation structure
as it exists today functions poorly on many levels.”16
The rate of adult felony probationers in California who fail to
successfully complete their probation terms is high.17 Most of
these felony “probation failures” are then sent to state prison as a
result of new felony convictions or violations of the terms of their
probation.18 The Legislative Analyst’s Office reported in 2009
that adult felony probationers are revoked to state prison at a
statewide average rate of about 7.5%; revocation to prison is as
high as 12–16% in some counties,19 and the overall level of
Warren, supra note 11, at 186–87.
Joan Petersilia, Influencing Public Policy: An Embedded Criminologist Reflects on
California Prison Reform, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 335, 341 (2008).
16 PROB.
SERV. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 70 (2003), available at
http://www2.courtinfo.ca.gov/probation/documents/new/fullreport.pdf [hereinafter PROB.
SERV. TASK FORCE].
17 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 19.
18 Id. at 20.
19 Id. at 30–31. The Legislative Analyst’s Office revocation statistics are likely lower
than the real statistics because they include only new admissions to state prison with a
14
15
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revocation of adult probationers (to jail and prison) is likely even
higher. These probation failures are thus incredibly costly for
the state.
California’s state prison system, the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), estimates
that each failed probationer sentenced to state prison will serve
8.6 months there.20 With the estimated average annual cost of
incarcerating a state prisoner at $49,000,21 each failed
probationer revoked to prison costs California an average of
$35,116.
California’s high rate of probation failure and generally
dysfunctional adult probation system may be traced to two
primary problems. First, and most significantly, a lack of stable
and adequate funding for county probation departments creates
overburdened caseloads for probation officers.22 This in turn
contributes to a low level of supervision for many serious
offenders as well as a lack of programming, such as treatment
and job training, which can help offenders successfully complete
their probation terms.23 Inadequate funding also creates adverse
incentives for probation departments and courts to keep
probationers in the community rather than send them to state
prison.24 Second, California’s decentralized probation system
leads to a dearth of unified standards and goals for probation
departments to follow.25
As a result, some probation
departments in California have fallen behind the curve in regard
to best practices.26
A. California’s Adult Probation Population
The challenges facing California’s probation departments are
rooted in the population and composition of probationers
themselves. Probation is the most frequently imposed form of
criminal sentence in California, and is not limited to the least
serious offenders.27 Estimates of the state’s adult probation
probation revocation flag on their record, and may not include probationers who had their
probation terminated prior to being sent to state prison. Id. Probation revocation
statistics from the California Department of Justice’s Criminal Justice Statistics Center
indicate higher levels of felony probation revocation, although many of these revocations
may be to county jail rather than prison. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS CENTER, ADULT PROBATION AND LOCAL ADULT SUPERVISION (2008), available
at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats?prof08/00/7.htm. Until there are better data reporting
systems in place, the true rates of revocation will remain unknown.
20 EXPERT PANEL, supra note 8.
21 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 19.
22 Id. at 17.
23 Id. at 19.
24 Id.
25 See generally PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16.
26 Id.
27 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 1.
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population range from roughly 325,00028 to 350,000.29 This
places California as third, after Texas and Georgia, for the
highest number of adult probationers in the United States.30 The
majority of these probationers are felony offenders. Roughly
three-quarters of adult probationers in California,31 or 270,000
adults,32 are felony convicts.
Mirroring national data,
probationers are overwhelmingly sentenced for drug and
property offenses.
In 2007, forty-one percent of adult
probationers in California were serving sentences for drug
crimes, and twenty-three percent for property crimes.33 Although
data regarding the criminogenic makeup of this population is
scant, national studies indicate that probationers have high rates
of substance abuse, mental illness, and unemployment—all
factors which correlate to criminal activity.34
In addition to a large and needy population, California’s
probation departments have struggled to keep pace with the
changing demographics of probationers. Over the past fifteen
years, the United States has experienced a rapid growth in the
population of adults on probation,35 and California is no
exception.36 From 1991 to 1999, the state’s total adult probation
population increased seven percent;37 from 1997 to 2007 it
increased fifteen percent.38 The number of new probation
sentences entered each year more than doubled over the last
decade, from 15,788 in 1999 to 35,684 in 2008.39 Significantly,
Id. at 19 (noting statistics compiled for Dec. 31, 2008).
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3 (detailing 2007 data).
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 18–19.
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8–9.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1228(a) (2010) (finding that “in 2007, nearly 270,000
felony offenders were subject to probation supervision in California’s communities”).
33 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 9.
34 See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND
TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS (1999), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf.mhtip.pdf; LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 9.
35 By the end of 1995, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported a probation
population of a little over three million. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22
CRIME & JUST. 149, 149–50 (1997). By the end of 2008, that number had increased by
over a million to 4,270,917. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 1.
36 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8.
The Bureau of Justice
Statistics reports substantial decline in California’s overall probation population in 2008.
However, this one-time decrease does not undermine the massive growth of the state’s
probation population over a fifteen year period. Nor is it clear what caused the decrease.
Unsatisfactory probation exits—failure to complete probation and subsequent revocation
to prison—might account for a portion of the decline; a decrease in misdemeanor
probation is another possibility. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
37 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 3.
38 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8.
39 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR, FINAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTION, AND COURT DISPOSITION OF ADULT FELONY ARRESTS BY
TYPE OF DISPOSITION STATEWIDE (2008), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/
prof08/00/6.htm. The annual number of new split sentences including probation
28
29
30
31
32
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this increase in the number of adult probationers includes a shift
in the underlying offenses from less serious to more serious.40 In
fact, the number of misdemeanor probationers decreased by
fifteen percent over the last decade.41 The rise in the total
probation population is thus due to a two-decade-long increase in
the number of felony probationers. In 1996, the California
Research Bureau reported an increasing backlog of sentenced
felons resulting in an increase in probation referrals.42 This
phenomenon is born out in the data: from 1990 to 1999, the
number of felony probationers nearly doubled, from 130,000 to
245,000,43 and then grew by approximately 50,000 more over the
next ten years.44 Thus, not only are probation departments
dealing with a significantly larger population than they were ten
or twenty years ago, but also a more risky population requiring
more supervision. This “clearly has placed different and more
intensive service demands on probation departments.”45
Unfortunately, probation departments have not been able to
keep pace. The California Legislative Analyst’s Office reports
that the rate at which California’s probationers successfully
complete their probation terms is lower than the national
average by ten percent.46 According to the U.S. Department of
Justice, in 2008, of the 199,528 “exit” from probation in
California, only 87,246 were “completions.”47 This means that
less than half of adults removed from probation successfully
completed their terms, while the rest lost probation status due to
failure.
A probationer “fails” probation when he has his
probation status revoked due to a technical violation, like failing
a drug test, or he is convicted for a new crime.48 Of those who fail

fluctuated from year to year between 1999 and 2008, but maintained a rough average of
about 128,000. Combining split sentences and pure probation sentences, the annual
number of new probation sentences was 140,705 in 1999 and 164,416 in 2008. Id.
40 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8.
41 Id.
42 MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION IN
CALIFORNIA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (1996), http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/96/06/
96006.pdf [hereinafter NIETO, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION].
43 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 3.
44 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 8.
45 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 3.
46 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 20. Indeed, as early as 1994,
California’s failure rate diverged from the national average. The California Research
Bureau reported that one-in-seven adult probationers in California had his or her
probation revoked, in comparison with a national average of one-in-ten. NIETO, THE
CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION, supra note 42, at 8.
47 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 23.
48 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (2010).
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each year, a significant portion—somewhere from 14,53249 to an
upward estimate of 20,00050—winds up in state prison.
B. Structure, Governance, and Practices
Despite the size and complexity of California’s probation
population, there is little centralized state oversight.
The
general statute governing probation in California is Penal Code
section1203, which defines probation as “the suspension of the
imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of conditional
and revocable release in the community under supervision of a
probation officer.”51 Other than this provision, there exists
relatively scant statutory language detailing the structure or
governance of probation departments, leaving counties to adopt
most of their own practices, unhindered by state oversight.52
California’s placement of primary responsibility for
probation in the hands of counties, rather than the state, is
unique. California is the “only state in the nation to follow a
strictly local operational model” for probation.53 The state has
fifty-eight independent probation departments, one for each of
the fifty-eight counties.54 In each county, one Chief Probation
Officer oversees and supervises the department, and appoints
deputy probation officers and other staff.55 In most counties, the
Chief Probation Officer is in turn appointed by the superior
court,56 and the local executive branch controls the management
and finances of probation.57
Probation departments perform a diverse array of roles for
the community. Probation not only “supervises” probationers—a
task which itself includes varying responsibilities, from support
to drug testing to enforcement—but also refers probationers to
EXPERT PANEL, supra note 8, at 143 (reporting 2006 data).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1228(b) (2010) (reporting 2007 data).
§ 1203(a).
The appointment process for chief probation officers is governed by CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1203.5 and § 1203.6, and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 225, § 270 and § 271
(West 2008); however, even this process varies widely among counties. PROB. SERV. TASK
FORCE, supra note 16, at 40–41. PENAL CODE § 1203.71 grants probation officers the
powers of a peace officer with regard to probationers under their supervision, and
§ 1203.73 grants probation officers necessary expense allowances from the county’s funds.
PENAL CODE § 1203 et seq. sets the basic requirements of probation, including presentence reports and reporting of probation violations.
53 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 61.
54 See State Juvenile Justice Profiles: California, NCJJ, http://70.89.227.250:8080/
stateprofiles/profiles/CA06.asp?state=%2Fstateprofiles%2Fprofiles%2FCA06.asp&topic=
(last updated Feb. 4, 2008).
55 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 40.
56 In several major population centers, including Los Angeles and San Diego, the
CPO is appointed by the local board of supervisors rather than the court. Id.
57 Id. at 61.
49
50
51
52
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programs, investigates crimes, oversees payment of court fines,
and manages custody facilities and electronic monitoring
systems.58 Probation thus assumes the difficult but important
task of “link[ing] the system’s many diverse stakeholders,
including law enforcement; the courts; prosecutors; defense
attorneys; community-based organizations; mental health, drug
and alcohol, and other services providers; the community; the
victim; and the probationer.”59 The multitude of probation’s roles
and partnerships, combined with the decentralization of
probation in California and the diverse populations in counties,
multiplies inconsistencies among probation departments as to
procedures used and programs available.
As a result, while some probation departments proceed
largely in keeping with current best practices, others are far
behind.60 The California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), after
conducting a study of thirty-one counties, noted that “many
probation departments do not follow all of the best probation
practices identified in research.”61 For example, the LAO found
that only eighty percent of surveyed counties use an evidencebased risk and needs assessment to evaluate at least some
segments of probationers.62 In addition, risk/needs assessments
are not widely used among the counties to make sentencing
recommendations in pre-sentence reports or in the process of
prioritizing which probationers ought to receive intensive
rehabilitation.63
Even assuming departments identify the
probationers best positioned to benefit from rehabilitation, some
counties lack rehabilitation programs that are open to
probationers, while other counties’ rehabilitation programs
“suffer from having limited capacity, few available locations, and
questionable quality.”64
Finally, evaluating the efficacy of
probation departments’ programs becomes challenging or
impossible due to varied data tracking systems. While several
counties, such as San Francisco, have begun to use electronic
systems to track data such as probation revocation rates,65 other
58 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 7–8; PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE,
supra note 16, at 49–54.
59 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 1.
60 See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 16 (finding that “the absence
of a stable funding source for adult probation, and the lack of fiscal incentives to promote
the best outcomes for public safety or efficiency, constitute major barriers to the
promotion of successful probation practices” in California).
61 Id. at 5, 16.
62 Id. at 17.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Interview with Wendy Still, Chief Adult Probation Officer, City and County of San
Francisco (April 28, 2010).
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counties still rely on paper,66 making compilations of data
impossible to create or evaluate.67 Many probation departments
surveyed could not inform the LAO of how many probationers
were participating in rehabilitation programs; and less than half
of the responding counties were able to report the number of
probation violations in a year.68
The only factor most counties have in common is the
excessive caseloads adult-probation officers juggle.69 The rising
numbers of probationers70 and lack of funding71 directly
contribute to this phenomenon. For California’s estimated
270,000 adult probationers, there are only about 3,000 sworn
adult probation officers supervising them.72 The American
Probation and Parole Association recommends fifty cases per
officer and twenty cases for specialized caseloads.73 While these
targets are idealistic, they are not realistic because caseloads in
California far exceed that—each officer oversees an average of
one hundred to two hundred cases, with specialized caseloads
averaging around seventy.74
High caseloads translate to less supervision for adult
probationers, particularly those not assigned to special oversight.
Most departments have “banked” caseloads, which receive little
or virtually no supervision.75 According to the Chief Probation
Officers of California (CPOC), approximately fifty-two percent of
all probationers in California are on banked caseloads.76 The low

66 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, Executive Director, Chief Probation
Officers of California (May 5, 2010). See also LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note
7, at 18–19 (“Although many departments indicated that they would like to be able to
track the above data, they currently lack the information technology systems that would
be needed to do so.”).
67 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 18 (“[O]ur survey found that a
majority of probation departments do not track the type of performance or outcome data
that is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of probation activities and programs.”).
68 Id.
69 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 47.
70 See supra Part I.A.
71 See infra Part I.C.
72 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 9.
73 Id. at 15, 17–18.
74 Id. at 18. The trend of large caseloads and “banking” probationers had already
begun in 1996:
[C]ounty probation officials are managing larger adult offender caseloads with
fewer resources, often resulting in little or no supervision . . . . Probation
departments are increasingly placing sentenced offenders into large ‘banked’
caseloads (a new form of unsupervised probation) with a statewide average
ratio of 629 offenders per probation officer.
NIETO, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION, supra note 42.
75 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 47.
76 CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CALIFORNIA, ADULT PROBATION SERVICES AND THE
NEED TO INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY, ACCOUNTABILITY, COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT AND
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level of supervision for banked cases results in a problematic
pattern: a probationer will build up repeated violations without
sanctions, and will escalate his criminal behavior until he
reaches a tipping point where a violation will result in a jail or
prison term.77 CPOC explains that banked caseloads mean
“there is little opportunity to intervene in the offenders[’] course
of current criminal behavior.”78 Given that experts acknowledge
that recidivism rates are high for felony probationers with
minimal supervision,79 it is unsurprising that California’s failure
rate is so high.
C. Funding and Adverse Incentives
Lack of adequate funds for adult probation is the primary
cause of California’s probation woes. Probation departments “do
not enjoy a stable, reliable funding base,”80 and instead subsist
on a “patchwork” financial structure that leaves adult probation
services badly under-resourced.81 Compared with the money
spent on prison, and even parole—both of which are state-run—
funds devoted to probation are meager at best. It costs the state
about $1,250 per year to maintain an offender on probation,
three times that amount—$4,500 per year—to maintain an
offender on parole, and forty times that amount to incarcerate a
prisoner.82
As with management, the funding model for probation is
local, and therein lies a portion of the problem. Prior to the
implementation of S.B. 678 in 2009, counties supplied two-thirds
of probation funding; one-quarter of funding came from the state;
and departments obtained the rest of their budget from federal
grants and various court fees.83 California is once more an
outlier in this respect—only one other state in the nation relies
on local government as its primary source of funding for
probation.84
Although in 2009 California supplied one-quarter of its
probation funds, it is important to emphasize that prior to the

COST EFFECTIVENESS (2008) [hereinafter CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CALIFORNIA],
available at http://67.199.72.34/php/Information/Papers/papers.php.
77 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 18.
78 CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 76.
79 Petersilia, Probation in the United States, supra note 35, at 181.
80 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 43
81 Id. at 6.
82 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 19.
83 Id. at 12.
84 LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS 29 (2007)
[hereinafter LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N], available at www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/
Report185.pdf.
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passage of S.B. 678, the state provided no stable, ongoing funding
for adult probation services.85 Proposition 172, a half-cent
statewide sales tax for local public safety departments,
contributes some funds for probation; and in 2007 and 2008, the
state also gave $10 million in one-time grants to improve
probation supervision and services for adults ages eighteen to
twenty-five.86 But other than these one-time grants, most state
money goes to juvenile probation programs. In the mid-1990s,
the Juvenile Crime Enforcement and Accountability Challenge
Grant Program and the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act
began funneling state resources to those under age eighteen.87
This resulted in a “somewhat overbalanced emphasis on juvenile
services,” meaning that “the limited number of remaining staff
and resources is often sorely insufficient to properly supervise
the adult probation population.”88
Insufficient numbers of
probation officers overseeing adults, lack of programs and
resources availability, large banked caseloads, and low
supervision directly follow from lack of funds.89
This dearth of funds for adult probation, in conjunction with
inadequate supervision and resources, creates an incentive
structure adverse to keeping probationers in the community.
Probation officers are incentivized to recommend incarceration
rather than probation since the state must then bear the
financial burden of that offender; moreover, sending a
probationer to prison is one less case for their already
overburdened loads.90 In addition, judges know there is a lack of
supervision of and resources available to the felony offenders
they might otherwise sentence to probation.91 Why keep a felony
offender in the community with little oversight or opportunity
when sending the offender to prison at least incapacitates him
from criminal activity on someone else’s dime?
Former
Sacramento Superior Court Judge Roger K. Warren explained
that “‘the principal reason . . . judges are sentencing too many
non-violent offenders to prison is the absence of effective
community corrections programs providing intermediate
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 12.
Id.
PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 44; LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE,
supra note 7, at 12. See also Telephone interview with Jerry Powers, Legislative Chair,
Chief Probation Officers of California and Stanislaus County Chief Probation Officer
(Apr. 29, 2010) (stating that, for the past fifteen years, there has been a fear that juvenile
crime was going to have a huge spike, and the state provided counties with funding so
they “could work from a preventative perspective”).
88 PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 44.
89 Id. at 6.
90 See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3.
91 LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84, at 26.
85
86
87
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punishments and necessary and appropriate treatment and
rehabilitation services . . . .’”92
Probation departments, law
enforcement, and courts worry about the headlines that could
result from an unsupervised criminal on the streets.93 And,
where resources are scarce and passing the buck is easy to do,
many county actors will choose to shift the burden to the state.
The Little Hoover Commission concluded that, as a result of
these adverse incentives, “the State squanders its most expensive
resource on low-level offenders who could be more effectively
supervised by local authorities.”94
II. ATTEMPTS TO FIX PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA AND ELSEWHERE
The problems with adult probation in California have been
apparent to those familiar with the situation for at least two
decades. S.B. 678 is only the latest attempt to fix adult
probation. To properly understand the origins of the new law
and the potential challenges facing its implementation, it is
necessary to survey the various reform efforts and failed projects
that preceded it. S.B. 678 builds upon experience gleaned over
the years from California’s own failed laws, the accumulation of
knowledge regarding criminogenic factors and best practices,
several expert reports, and legislative experiments in other
states.
A. California’s Failed Probation Legislation
The California Legislature enacted the first probation laws
in 1903.95 However, the first major legislative attempt to
substantively impact county probation practices was the
California Probation Subsidy Act of 1965.96 The Probation
Subsidy Act was an incentive-based funding provision, the basic
structure of which has much in common with S.B. 678.97 The
Probation Subsidy Act provided counties up to $4,000 for each
adult or juvenile offender supervised in the community, rather
than sent to prison.98 The state provided counties with the
subsidies based on probation departments’ improvement over
Id.
See, e.g., Adam Foxman, Proposed Prison Budget Cuts Worry Local Law Enforcers,
VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Feb. 1, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2008/feb/
01/proposed-prison-budget-cuts-worry-local-law/.
94 LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84, at 27.
95 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 et seq. (West 2004).
96 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 14.
97 MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS (1996) [hereinafer
NIETO, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS], available at http://www.library.ca.gov/
crb/96/08/index.html.
98 Id.
92
93
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historical commitment levels,99 thus incentivizing counties to
maintain probationers in the community and lower their
revocation rates. Proponents of the Subsidy Act optimistically
argued that: “[T]he state payment is sufficient to provide
excellent supervisory and ancillary programs for three or four
times as many persons as were not committed. . . . In fact, the
program should increase public protection through prevention of
delinquency and reduction of repeated criminality.”100
Especially in its early years, the Subsidy Act lived up to
these expectations, diverting more than 45,000 offenders from
state institutions to local probation programs.101 However,
various factors contributed to the Legislature’s eventual decision
to cease the subsidies. First, although the Subsidy Act provided
counties with more funding, most counties did not implement
new services for offenders, such as halfway houses and day
service centers.102 Second, the Act’s subsidies did not keep pace
with the rate of inflation, undermining its efficacy at enticing
counties to supervise offenders.103 And third, the Legislature
came to consider the program too costly.104 As nationwide
sensibilities shifted from rehabilitation to incapacitation,
California’s move to a determinate sentencing scheme as well as
the passage of tough on crime laws multiplied the number of
offenders and the cost of prisons.105 Ending the subsidies
immediately saved money for the state, although in the long term
it might have proven more cost effective to fix the Subsidy Act
rather than to scrap it.106 As a result, in 1978 the Legislature
replaced the Probation Subsidy Act with the County Justice
System Subvention Program, which provided counties with
grants to support local justice programs.107
Later, the
Subvention Program became a block grant with few
requirements for grantees, and thus had little impact on prison
commitments.108 By 1992, the Subvention Program represented
only 7.5% of county probation expenditures statewide.109
99
100

Id.
STANFORD

CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STATE/COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PARTNERSHIPS IN CALIFORNIA: AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY 2 (2007) [hereinafter STANFORD
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR.], available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_
detail.aspx?id=32980.
101 NIETO, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS, supra note 97.
102 Id.
103 STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., supra note 100.
104 Id.
105 NIETO, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS, supra note 97.
106 STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., supra note 100.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 2–3. “The County Justice Subvention Program still exists, see Cal. Welf. &
Inst. Code § 1805 et seq., but deals only with probation services for juveniles.” Id. at 3.
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Legislators enacted the second major attempt to impact
probation in the mid-1990s as part of a trend of states enacting
“community corrections acts.”110 These diverse acts all created
“mechanisms by which state funds [were] granted to local
governments and community agencies to encourage local
sanctions in lieu of prison or jail.”111 Already in the late 1980s, a
population crunch threatened California state prisons.112 In
1990, the California Blue Ribbon Commission on Inmate
Population Management recommended adopting a community
corrections act to expand community-based intermediate
sanctions.113 As a result, the Legislature passed the CommunityBased Punishment Act of 1994.114 The Community Based
Punishment Act would establish a “partnership between the
state and local government” to expand probation in an effort to
ease prison overcrowding.115 As recommended, the Community
Based Punishment Act encouraged counties to develop
“intermediate sanctions” such as short-term jail stays, boot camp,
home detention and electronic monitoring, community service,
drug testing, rehabilitation, and job training.116 The Legislature
recognized that probation programs required a “consistent,
reliable, and separate funding source;” and it designated the
California Board of Corrections to oversee the approval of county
corrections plans and the annual doling out of funds.117
Those funds never materialized. The Achilles heel of the
Community Based Punishment Act was not its goals or even its
basic structure, but the total lack of long-term guaranteed
funding or startup moneys. Implementation was “contingent
upon the availability of funding” from the state budget, federal
funds, private grants, and “[o]ther sources as may be identified
as suitable . . . .”118 The Community Based Punishment Act
comically instructed the Board of Corrections to “seek startup
funding . . . from public and private sources commencing as soon
as practicable.”119 In 1995, the State Legislature allocated $2
million to the Board of Corrections to fund county planning
grants.120 This paltry sum was never replicated. Needless to say,

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

See NIETO, COMMUNITY CORRECTION PUNISHMENTS, supra note 97.
Id.
LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84, at 17.
Id. at 28.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 8050 et seq. (West 2000).
§ 8051 (providing the “Legislative Findings”).
§ 8052(e).
§§ 8051(f), 8061.
§ 8090.
§ 8092.
NIETO, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION, supra note 42, at 12.
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the Community Based Punishment Act was a total failure as a
result of these vague financial directives.121
Following the 1994 act, there were no further legislative
initiatives to fix adult probation until the state prison crisis came
to a head in the late 2000s.122 But, the 1965 Probation Subsidy
Act and the 1994 Community Based Punishment Act are still
significant in that they communicate important lessons
regarding implementation of reforms. First, the Probation
Subsidy Act’s initial success proves that state funds for county
probation, if properly structured, can incentivize counties to
supervise offenders in the community.
Second, successful
implementation of a probation reform act requires a guaranteed
and steady source of funding—both start-up and long-term.
Third, once programs are implemented, the Legislature ought to
make periodic evaluations of the programs and formulate
adjustments as necessary.123 If the Legislature had adjusted the
Probation Subsidy Act to account for inflation, the Subsidy Act
might have proven to be more successful in the long-term. And
fourth, in a partnership between state and local authorities, each
party must try to require accountability of the other. For
example, California ought to have required probation
departments to implement new programs with subsidies from the
1965 Act. Relations between state and locals are notoriously
difficult in California, and public safety collaborations tend to be
strained.124
Mutual accountability is necessary for such
collaborations to work.125
B. Best Practices and Recommendations
In the thirty or so years since California abandoned the
Probation Subsidy Act, criminologists have made major advances
in understanding what factors tend to impact offenders’ rates of
recidivism, and what programs and sentencing structures are
best able to reduce the risk of re-offense. A body of “best
practices” for community punishment and other forms of
corrections has gradually emerged and is only now gaining
See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84, at 28.
Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009, CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1228–1233.8 (2010).
123 In fact, the CBPA did provide for an annual progress report to the Legislature, but
only on request. See § 8061(j).
124 STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., supra note 100, at 1.
125 See, e.g., Kristina Smock, Building Effective Partnerships: The Process and
Structure of Collaboration, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE, May–June 1999, http://www.nhi.org/
online/issues/105/smock.html (arguing that, “[w]ithout enforceable rules of interaction
[including mutual accountability], organizational partnerships often take the form of loose
networks than functional collaborations[,]” and can sometimes cause “organizations [to
be] unwilling to fully commit to potentially productive partnerships . . . .”).
121
122
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headway in policy. Significantly, this research shows that
behavior change and rehabilitation can be successful when
implemented properly for the right subsection of offenders.126
Briefly, best practices include: (1) a combination of
surveillance and treatment for probationers, rather than one or
the other alone;127 (2) the use of evidence-based practices risk and
needs assessment tools;128 (3) swift, certain, and proportionate
punishment for all probation violations, with a concomitant
range of graduated sanctions129 and positive incentives for
offenders;130 and (4) community coordination and cooperation.131
Over the last decade, various statewide studies and reports have
recommended reforms for California’s probation system,
including some of these practices.
In 2000, California’s Administrative Office of the Courts
appointed a Probation Services Task Force to perform a

126 See, e.g., MATTHEW T. DEMICHELE, AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, PROBATION AND
PAROLE’S GROWING CASELOADS AND WORKLOAD ALLOCATION: STRATEGIES FOR
MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 12 (2007), available at http://www.appa-net.org/eweb/
docs/appa/pubs/SMDM.pdf (“The research evidence in favor of offender behavior change as
the most effective strategy to enhance public safety is impressive and voluminous.”)
(citing various studies).
127 Criminologists have found that in programs where offenders receive a combination
of surveillance and relevant treatment or “prosocial activities” such as education and
employment programs, recidivism was reduced by twenty to thirty percent. See, e.g., Joan
Petersilia, A Decade of Experimenting with Intermediate Sanctions: What Have We
Learned? CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Summer 1999, at 19, 23; Petersilia, Probation in the
United States, supra note 35, at 186. See also DEMICHELE, supra note 126, at 8, 11–14
(recommending an “integrated approach of surveillance, treatment, and enforcement,”
and arguing that “the justice system goals of punishment and rehabilitation can
effectively co-exist if carefully managed and thoroughly understood”).
128 CRIME & JUSTICE INST. & NAT’L INST. OF CORR., IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED
POLICY AND PRACTICE IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS ix (2d ed. 2009) (“Evidence-based
practice (EBP) is the objective, balanced, and responsible use of current research and the
best available data to guide policy and practice decisions, such that outcomes for
consumers are improved . . . . [E]vidence-based practice focuses on approaches
demonstrated to be effective through empirical research rather than through anecdote or
professional experience alone.”). See also PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 81;
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 13; DEMICHELE, supra note 126, at 8, 10,
21, 30 (recommending risk/needs actuarial tools).
129 See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST.
1, 8 (2006); PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 8.
130 See, e.g., COLORADO DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, EVIDENCE BASED CORRECTIONAL
PRACTICES 5 (2007), available at www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0805SENTENCERES10.pdf
(“Researchers have found that optimal behavior change results when the ratio of
reinforcements is four positive to every negative reinforcement.”).
131 Given probation’s position as the “link” between justice system actors, successful
collaboration with key stakeholders, such as police and service providers, is crucial to the
success of community corrections programs. See, e.g., Petersilia, A Decade of
Experimenting with Intermediate Sanctions: What Have We Learned?, supra note 127, at
27 (“Workable, long-term solutions must come from the community and be embraced and
actively supported by the community.”);; PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 76,
96; DEMICHELE, supra note 126, at 28.
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comprehensive review of probation in California.132 When it
issued its Final Report in 2003, the Task Force set out seventeen
recommendations to improve the unacceptable “status quo.”133
These recommendations included the provision of stable and
adequate funding; more centralized governance of probation; the
development of measurable goals and objectives; the adoption of
risk/needs assessments and meaningful program evaluations;
creating a graduated continuum of services and sanctions,
especially for adults; and greater collaboration among courts,
counties, and other community agencies.134
Nothing immediately resulted from the Task Force report.
In 2007, as the prison overcrowding crisis came to a head, the
Little Hoover Commission published a report titled “Solving
California’s Corrections Crisis,” subtitled “Time is Running
Out.”135 Although the Little Hoover Commission evaluated the
whole corrections structure, it in particular recommended
“reallocating resources [from state prison] to community based
alternatives,”136 and “assist[ing] counties in expanding intensive
probation,”137 as well as implementing evidence-based practices
and a “continuum of alternatives to prison.”138 Various witnesses
told the Commission that California should re-establish
something like the original Probation Subsidy Act.139
Finally, in 2009, as the Legislature was drafting S.B. 678,
the Legislative Analyst’s Office published a report on probation,
“Achieving Better Outcomes for Adult Probation.”140 The LAO
identified a set of best practices for probation, including the use
of risk and needs assessments, program reviews and evaluations
based on data collection, referral to treatment and assistance
services, a reduction in probation officers’ caseloads, and a
system of graduated sanctions to combat the cycle of criminal
activity buildup followed by revocation.141 Ultimately, the LAO
settled on recommending an incentive-based funding program for
probation,142 not unlike the one recently implemented in Arizona.

132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

See generally PROB. SERV. TASK FORCE, supra note 16.
Id. at 61–98.
Id.
See generally LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84.
Id. at iii.
Id. at vi.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 28.
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 6–29.
Id.
Id. at 29.
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C. Legislative Initiatives in Other States
California is not the only state to experience a problematic
rise in its prison population and a concomitant rise in
probationers. A small number of other states—Kansas and
Arizona, in particular—have implemented experimental
legislation in an attempt to reduce probationers’ recidivism.143
S.B. 678 is not identical to any of these initiatives, but it does
adopt certain aspects of their provisions.144 Although these
states have different probation systems than California, it is
worthwhile to examine their initiatives to better understand the
policy choices California has made.
Kansas and Arizona have each passed formal legislation
addressing probation reform, Kansas in 2007 and Arizona in
2008.145 Both states articulated similar overall goals for the
legislation, including increasing public safety, increasing services
for probationers, and, ultimately, reducing the rate of probation
revocation.146 Also, both states were concerned with their rising
prison populations and crime rates.147 Although their goals were
the same, the states’ approaches did differ in significant respects.
Kansas’ S.B. 14, also known as the Community Corrections
Statewide Risk Reduction Initiative (RRI), set up a competitive
grant application system for counties and established a statewide
goal of reducing each probation agency’s revocation rate by

143 Other states, such as Hawaii, have reformed probation through innovative
programming rather than legislation. See infra Part IV.A (briefly discussing Hawaii’s
Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program).
144 See infra Part IV.A.
145 Kansas S.B. 14, codified as KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-52,112 (West 2007 & Supp.
2009); Arizona S.B. 1476, codified as ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-267, 12-270, 13-924
(West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
146 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-112(a), (b); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-267(A)(2)(e), 12270(A) (Supp. 2009). See generally S.B. 1476, 2008 48th Leg., 2nd Sess., § 7 (Ariz. 2008)
(House Engrossed Senate Bill), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/48leg/2r/bills/
sb1476p.pdf.
147 Ariz. S.B. 1476, at § 7 (“1. Arizona’s prison population is unacceptably high and
among the highest in the nation. 2. Arizona’s prison population is expected to increase by
fifty per cent from 2007 to 2017 . . . .”);; PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, WORK
IN
THE
STATES: SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN KANSAS 1 (2008),
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Kansas(1).pdf (noting that the
Kansas “Sentencing Commission projected in 2006 that the prison population would grow
26 percent over the next 10 years, costing taxpayers an additional $500 million”). In fact,
Kan. S.B. 14 introduced sweeping reform of the entire correctional system, including an
increase in good-time credit awarded to state prison inmates for completion of programs,
and a comprehensive review of Kansas’ sentencing policies. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
DEP’T, THIRD CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT BRIEF HOUSE SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE
BILL NO. 14, at 1-14 (2007), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/supplemental/
2008/CCRB14.pdf.
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twenty percent using a FY 2006 baseline.148 Under the RRI,
probation agencies (called “community corrections” in Kansas)
submit grant proposals to the Department of Corrections which
then distributes funds to community corrections agencies based
on plans that accord with the RRI’s stated requirements.149 In
particular, the RRI requires the adoption of risk assessment
instruments, provision of evidence-based treatment and services,
and ongoing data tracking and evaluation of set goals.150
Significantly, the grants are tied to outcomes: the Department of
Corrections continues to fund programs only if they are meeting
their established goals.151
Rather than set a statewide revocation reduction goal,
Arizona’s S.B. 1476, the Safe Communities Act, creates an
incentive-based funding initiative for county probation
departments whereby probation receives a portion of the money
saved by the state prison system when probationers remain in
the community.152
Annually, the Joint Legislative Budget
Committee calculates for each county the costs avoided by the
Department of Corrections that may be attributed to reducing
the county’s rate of revocation.153 This is accomplished by
comparing the number of revocations to state prison in each
county with a county-specific baseline revocation rate established
in 2007–2008; the Budget Committee does the same for the
number of probationers with new felony convictions.154 As long
as the number of revocations and new convictions are decreasing
compared with its baseline rates, each county will receive forty
percent of the cost savings, to be spent on substance abuse
treatment, risk reduction programs, and victim services.155 This
provides a source of funding for probation departments that is
directly tied to their ability to reduce revocations and improve
services; at the same time, it insures a cost-savings for the state
since sixty percent of total cost savings remain unallocated.

148 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-52,112(a); The Senate Bill 14 Risk Reduction Initiative, KAN.
DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.doc.ks.gov/publications/the-senate-bill-14-risk-reductioninitiative (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
149 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-52,112(a), (b).
150 § 75-52,112(b).
151 § 75-52,112(d) (“The department of corrections shall evaluate the programs which
received a grant using a research-based process evaluation targeting the critical
components of effective programs to ensure that the program is being delivered as such
program was designed. Continued funding shall be contingent on the program meeting
the established goals.”).
152 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-270(A)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
153 § 12-270(A)(1).
154 §§ 12-270(A)(1) and (2).
155 §§ 12-270(B), 12-267(A)(2)(e).
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In addition to providing a steady stream of funding for
outcomes-improving probation departments, the Arizona Safe
Communities Act also provides “earned time credit” for
probationers for their good behavior.156 On the recommendation
of an adult probation officer, a judge may reduce a probationer’s
term of supervision by twenty days for every month in which the
probationer “1) [e]xhibits positive progression toward the goals
and treatment of the probationer’s case plan, 2) [i]s current on
payments for court ordered restitution . . . , or 3) [i]s current in
completing community restitution.”157 The earned-time credit
provision creates a positive incentive for probationers to engage
with services such as treatment and education, to interact with
their probation officers, and to fulfill their other obligations. The
goal, of course, is both to improve offenders’ chances of success on
probation and to successfully graduate more probationers from
their sentences.
Although Arizona’s statute is arguably more innovative than
Kansas’, particularly with regard to its sharing of cost-savings,
Kansas’ RRI does place more emphasis on developing the kinds of
meticulously planned programs that are shown to work well at
reducing recidivism, including evidence-based practices,
probation staff training, treatment services, education and
employment training, data collection, and careful evaluation.158
Regardless of the differences, both initiatives have shown early
promise, although the real funds for Arizona’s program will not
be distributed until 2010–2011.159 According to the Kansas
Department of Corrections (KDOC), programs which received the
RRI grants achieved the twenty percent revocation reduction
goal within one year and exceeded it within two years.160
Between 2006 and 2008, Kansas reported a statewide decrease in
revocations to prison of 21.9%.161 It simultaneously experienced
a 26.2% increase in probationers successfully completing their
probation terms.162
Each community corrections agency
§ 13-924(A).
§ 13-924(B). Certain offenders are not eligible for earned time credit, including
those on probation for more serious felony offenses or misdemeanor offenses, those on
lifetime probation, and sex offenders. § 13-924(C). In other words, earned time credit is
not available for probationers with the highest and the lowest risk of re-offenses.
158 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-52,112 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009).
159 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-270(B).
160 Statement at Justice Reinvestment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 110th Cong. 4 (2009), available at
www.justicereinvestment.org/files/Kansas.Werhotlz.pdf (statement of Roger Werholtz,
Secretary of the Kansas Department of Corrections).
161 KAN. DEP’T OF CORR., STATEWIDE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS RISK INITIATIVE
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009), available at http://www.doc.ks.gov/publications/the-senate-bill14-risk-reduction-initiative/SB_14_Risk_Reduction_Initiative_Report_2009.pdf/.
162 Id.
156
157
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submitted a detailed RRI plan to the KDOC, which included a
succinct goal and program data.163 In the first two years, the
KDOC engaged in extensive risk reduction education and skills
development for community corrections staff and helped agencies
develop evidence-based practices individualized to their targeted
populations.164 Arizona, meanwhile, also exhibits positive trends,
including a one-year thirteen percent decrease in revocation to
jails or prison,165 and a 1.9% decrease in probationers’ new felony
convictions.166 If these positive trends can be attributed to the
Safe Communities Act—and in fact the report does not chart any
definite linkage—then results must flow from the earned-time
credit, since the incentive-based funding does not begin until
2010–2011.167
Although Arizona and Kansas each have very different
probation systems than California, the early success of these
legislative attempts to reform probation provides an optimistic
outlook for California’s new initiative.
III. CALIFORNIA S.B. 678, THE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS
PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES ACT
For more than a decade, those familiar with California’s
probation system grew increasingly critical of the system’s
inability to handle the rising numbers of adult felony
probationers sentenced to the community. Finally, in 2009, the
Legislature heeded their warnings and drafted a bill which
declared that “[a]dult probation is a ticking time bomb waiting to
go off.”168 The Senate Committee on Public Safety acknowledged
that “[t]he state has been overlooking probation as an essential
partner in community corrections,”169 and noted that “because
probation is so sorely under-resourced very little can be done to
stop [felony probationers’] cycle of offending.”170 However, this
official recognition of the need to reform adult probation arrived
only as the result of an extraordinary moment of crisis in
California’s justice system, and after careful political
Id. at 15–96.
Id. at 2–11.
ARIZ. ADULT PROB., PROBATION REVOCATION & CRIME REDUCTION REPORT FY
2009, at 7 (2009), available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/25/SafeCommunitiesAct/
FINAL_SB_1476_RPT_FY09.pdf.
166 Id. at 10.
167 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-270(B) (West 2009).
168 Bill Analysis, Hearing on S.B. 678 Before the Assem. Comm. on Public Safety,
2009–2010 Sess. 13 (Cal. June 16, 2009) [hereinafter Bill Analysis, June].
169 Id. at 14.
170 Id. at 13.
163
164
165

Do Not Delete

396

3/16/2011 4:54 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:375

maneuvering on the part of probation supporters. The resulting
statute, the Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act,
is a hybrid of the Arizona and Kansas acts and includes many of
the expert recommendations described in Part II of this article.
A. The Perfect Political Storm
The Chief Probation Officers of California (CPOC), the
statewide association of California probation officers which
became the primary sponsor of S.B. 678, worked for several years
prior to the bill’s passage to educate members of the government
regarding the need for funds for adult probation.171 Beginning in
the mid-1990s, the Legislature began to approve various grants
and funding sources for juvenile probation which successfully
reduced the number of juveniles in state institutions.172 One
initiative was the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act, passed
in 2001, which provided a steady source of funding to counties for
programs targeting at-risk youth and young offenders.173 The
rate of juvenile incarceration dropped by seventy percent
between 1994 and 2004.174 According to Jerry Powers, CPOC
Legislative Chair, this preventative partnership between the
state and counties demonstrated that “if you put money in on the
front end, you save money on the back end, so everyone saves
money.”175 Given the success of the juvenile initiatives, those in
probation began to work toward something similar for adult
services.176
CPOC Executive Director Karen Pank, who had recently left
Governor Schwarzenegger’s office, helped the association put
together a strategic plan to bring attention to the issue and
suggested that they make a pitch appealing to the governor’s
public safety platform: “We knew we had this looming prison
crisis, so what better way than to be proactive . . . .”177 Governor
Schwarzenegger, who had vowed to reform California’s

171 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66; telephone interview with
Jerry Powers, supra note 87.
172 For a summary of these grants and initiatives, see generally SUSAN TURNER &
TERRY FAIN, RAND, ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN JUVENILE PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA OVER THE
LAST DECADE (2005), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/
RAND_TR297.pdf.
173 See id. at xiii.
174 Id. In 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the Juvenile Justice Realignment
Act, which furthered the transition from state incarceration to local supervision of
juvenile offenders. Petersilia, A Retrospective View of Corrections Reform in the
Schwarzenegger Administration, supra note 9, at 151.
175 Telephone interview with Jerry Powers, supra note 87.
176 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66; telephone interview with
Jerry Powers, supra note 87.
177 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66.
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correctional system early in his tenure,178 liked the idea so much
he proposed $100 million in funds for adult probation as part of
the 2007–2008 budget.179 But the budget line did not get past the
Legislature where prison overcrowding had not yet reached the
boiling point.
The prison and budget crises did, however, help coalesce
CPOC’s attempts to educate legislators regarding the need to
fund adult probation. In 2007, CPOC became an intervener in
Plata v. Schwarzenegger, one of the federal lawsuits addressing
overcrowding in California’s prisons.180 The association joined
the lawsuit to argue that California ought to invest in probation
in order to prevent offenders from being sent to prison in the first
place.181 Mr. Powers, the Chief Probation Officer for Stanislaus
County, offered testimony before the federal three-judge panel,
and later at a joint-legislative hearing, regarding the potential
release of inmates ordered by the suit. “I told them I was
opposed to the release,” Mr. Powers said.182 “You could do the
same thing [i.e., decrease the prison population] in a much safer
manner by slowing down the flow to prison in the first place.”183
CPOC’s arguments interested staff members of the Senate
Committee on Public Safety, who in late 2008 had learned about
the new Arizona Safe Communities Act as well as a recent Pew
Center report encouraging states to draft similar performanceincentive acts for community corrections.184 Senator Mark Leno,
the Chair of the Senate Committee on Public Safety, reached out
to CPOC regarding the possibility of addressing the prison crisis
through probation.185
Two factors in particular influenced the drafting of the
legislation: California’s fiscal crisis and Sacramento’s notoriously
unforgiving politics. The fiscal crisis combined with the prison
overcrowding crisis to create an extraordinary moment in
California politics—what Senator Leno termed “the perfect

178 Petersilia, A Retrospective View of Corrections Reform in the Schwarzenegger
Administration, supra note 9, at 148.
179 Telephone interview with Jerry Powers, supra note 87.
180 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66; telephone interview with
Jerry Powers, supra note 87.
181 Telephone interview with Jerry Powers, supra note 87.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, Chief Counsel, California Senate
Committee on Public Safety (May 10, 2010); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY
PERFORMANCE PROJECT: POLICY FRAMEWORK TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS
1 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Policy%20
Framework.pdf.
185 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66.
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storm”186—in which criminal justice reformers were able to break
through the state’s otherwise “nearly impassable political
barriers . . . .”187 The three-judge panel had ordered the release
of inmates;188 the Legislature needed to cut spending. Reducing
the prison population was therefore an immediate goal, and
improving probation a way to do it. But, the lack of funds meant
that money for adult probation could not be provided in the way
that the Legislature had previously funded juvenile probation—
with state grants and budget items.189 Alison Anderson, the
Chief Counsel for the Senate Committee on Public Safety, had
worked on public safety since 1994 and saw potential in Arizona’s
funding incentives model.190 “We’re upside-down in how we
invest some of our public safety dollars,” Ms. Anderson said.191
She began to think that “maybe there’s a way we can share state
savings with locals.”192 Arizona’s funding incentives model is
better suited to hard economic times than Kansas’ grant-based
approach because it requires no state funding without
concomitant savings. However, while the double-crisis did create
a window of opportunity, Sacramento politics remained a
formidable barrier to the passage of any reform effort. Senator
Leno is a high-profile Democrat,193 and Ms. Pank felt that a
bipartisan approach would be necessary to give the bill any
chance of success.194 Before drafting began, the idea was pitched
to former Senator John Benoit, a Republican, as a way to
increase public safety while decreasing the prison population.195
Senator Benoit agreed to become the co-author of the bill with
Senator Leno.196 With a bipartisan pact in place, Ms. Anderson
began drafting a bill that would provide funding for adult
probation.197
The resulting legislation, The Community Corrections
Performance Incentives Act (CCPIA), introduced as S.B. 678, is

186 Mark Leno, Reforming Corrections: We’ve Only Just Begun, CAP. WKLY., Nov. 30,
2009, at A11, available at http://dist03.casen.govoffice.com/.
187 Id.
188 See Opinion and Order, at 183, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520
LKK JFM P (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
189 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66.
194 Id.
195 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184.
196 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66; Telephone interview with
Jerry Powers, supra note 87; Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184.
197 Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184.
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“specifically designed to pay for itself”198 while simultaneously
providing stable funding for adult felony probation, and thus
promising economic viability.199
The CCPIA incorporates
recommendations made by the Pew Center report, the LAO
report, the Probation Services Task Force, and the findings in
2007 of the Little Hoover Commission.200 As a result, the CCPIA
is an amalgamation of Arizona’s incentive-based model and the
evidence-based emphasis of Kansas’ results-driven act.
B. The Three-Step Funding Formula
The CCPIA specifically targets adult felony probationers. As
in Arizona, the CCPIA sets up a formula by which county
probation departments receive annual funds from the state
commensurate with each county’s success in preventing
probationers from being sent to state prison.201 The formula
involves three steps. In the first step, a cooperative of several
statewide agencies and organizations202 calculates for each
county its annual probation revocation rate as well as the annual
statewide probation revocation rate.203 The counties are then
placed into two tiers: those with failure rates that are no more
than twenty-five percent higher than the statewide failure rate
(Tier 1), and those with failure rates that are more than twentyfive percent above the statewide rate (Tier 2).204
In the second step, the annual county revocation rate is
compared to a baseline revocation rate, and calculated for each
county using 2006–2008 data,205 in order to arrive at a yearly
estimate of the number of probationers each county successfully
prevented from revocation to prison.206 Tier 1 counties will
receive funds equal to forty-five percent of the costs that the
198 Press Release, Mark Leno, Leno-Benoit Plan to Reduce Prison Population Clears
Major Hurdle (June 16, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, Mark Leno], available at
http://dist03.casen.govoffice.com/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC={F0DFD1A5-1C7B-4F099F09-C48A423D1072}&DE={946E1572-5079-4AEE-BF04-9DEBF1A4FDED}.
199 See Bill Analysis: Hearing on S.B. 678 Before the S. Comm. on Public Safety,
2009–2010 Sess. H (Cal. Apr. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Bill Analysis, April], available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_678_cfa_20090427_164719_
sen_comm.html.
200 See generally Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199; Bill Analysis, June, supra note
168.
201 Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199, at 13.
202 These include the California Director of Finance, CDCR, CPOC, the
Administrative Office of the Courts, and the Joint Legislative Budget Committee. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1233.1 (2010).
203 §§ 1233.1(b), (c).
204 § 1233.2.
205 § 1233(a).
206 § 1233.1(d). The number of felony probationers revoked to prison is inclusive of
those sent for conviction of a new felony offense as well as those revoked for other
violations. §§ 1233.1(d), (e).
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CDCR avoided for that county as a result of not having to
incarcerate those probationers.207
This is calculated by
multiplying the number of probationers successfully prevented
from revocation by forty-five percent of the annual cost to
incarcerate in prison and supervise on parole a failed
probationer.208 The Tier 2 counties will receive forty percent of
costs avoided.209
Tier1: Higher Performing Counties
# Probationers Prevented from Revocation to Prison x .45(annual
incarceration cost for 1 revoked probationer)
Tier 2: Lower Performing Counties
# Probationers Prevented from Revocation to Prison x .4(annual
incarceration cost for 1 revoked probationer)

Thus, counties with higher success rates (Tier 1) will receive
a larger portion of costs avoided attributed to their success,
although the exact dollar amount will be dependent upon the
number of probationers prevented from revocation. This means
that larger counties with smaller success rates might still receive
more funding than small but highly successful counties.
The third step is meant to reward the state’s highest
performing counties, all of which will be in Tier 1. Counties with
revocation rates more than fifty percent below the statewide
revocation rate can choose between receiving the Tier 1
calculation and a “high performance grant.”210 Annually, the
state will calculate five percent of total savings to the state
attributed to all counties’ successful reduction of revocations that
year.211 Each county opting for a high performance grant will
receive a share of the five percent calculation based on the
county’s total population (not just probationers) of eighteen to
twenty-five year-olds.212
Ms. Anderson explained that the high performance grants,
which do not appear in the Arizona bill, are intended to ensure
adequate recognition of counties that are already highperforming.213 To understand how the high performance grant
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

§ 1233.3(a).
§ 1233.3(a).
§ 1233.3(b).
§ 1233.4(e).
§ 1233.4(b).
§ 1233.4.
Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184.
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might benefit a county, contrast Contra Costa County and Los
Angeles County. From 2005–2007, Contra Costa County had an
average revocation rate of one percent, placing it well below the
statewide average of 7.5%.214 Los Angeles County, in contrast,
had a 10.7% average revocation rate, placing it in Tier 2.215
However, Los Angeles County has a total population of adult
felony probationers more than eighteen times the size of Contra
Costa’s.216 So, even though Contra Costa will be Tier 1, the
number of Contra Costa probationers prevented from revocation
might be much smaller than Los Angeles County’s, and the funds
it receives from the Tier 1 calculation smaller than Los Angeles
County’s Tier 2 calculation. But, Contra Costa’s total eighteen to
twenty-five year-old population is large—about 124,000.217
Contra Costa would therefore receive a fairly large amount of the
high performance grant if it opted to do so, and this would
potentially amount to more money than the Tier 1 calculation
would otherwise provide.
This three-step formula aims to realign the fiscal
relationship between the state and county probation
departments, and, in the process, realign the adverse incentives
formerly in place. The CCPIA encourages counties to supervise
offenders in the community, rather than pass the buck to the
state—the lower a county’s failure rate, the more state funds it
will receive. The formula is good for the state as well since it
saves a portion of the money that it would otherwise spend on
incarcerating probationers.
The Assembly Appropriations
Committee projects annual General Fund savings of tens of
millions of dollars, with savings of $30 million projected for
2009–2010.218 The Department of Finance projected that if half
of the roughly twenty thousand felony probationers revoked to
prison instead remained in the community—an ambitious
estimate—annual savings for the state would be as high as
$255 million, while counties could receive up to $127.3 million.219

214 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 30–31. See supra note 19 for an
evaluation of the accuracy of these revocation rates.
215 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 30–31.
216 Id. Los Angeles County has 54,285 adult felony probationers, while Contra Costa
has 3,039. Id.
217 CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, REQUEST FOR APPLICATION FOR THE EVIDENCEBASED PROBATION SUPERVISION PROGRAM 2 (2009), available at http://www.calema.ca.gov/
WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/OESLevsPDF/2009%20Evidence-Based%20Probation%
20Supervision%20Program/$file/EBPSP09%20RFA.pdf.
218 Bill Analysis: Hearing on S.B. 678 Before the S. Rules Comm., 2009–2010 Sess.
Fiscal Effect (Cal. Sept. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Bill Analysis, September].
219 Bill Analysis: Hearing on S.B. 678 Before the Cal. Dep’t of Finance, 2009–2010
Sess. (Cal. Aug. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Bill Analysis, August], available at
http://www.dof.ca.gov/legislative_analyses/search.php.
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C. Evidence-Based Programs and Practices
In addition to creating a complex but strategic funding
formula, the CCPIA stipulates that county probation
departments must spend these funds on “evidence-based
community corrections practices and programs”220 for adult
felony probationers. In particular, the CCPIA recommends
implementing and expanding the use of risk and needs
assessments to evaluate what level of supervision and which
programs each offender requires.221 It also suggests the use of
intermediate sanctions such as electronic monitoring, mandatory
community service, “restorative justice programs,” and
incarceration in county jail; “providing more intense probation
supervision;” and expanding the availability of evidence-based
programs and rehabilitation for substance abuse, mental health,
cognitive behavior, and employment training.222
While the California Department of Finance and the
Administrative Office of the Courts calculate and disburse the
annual funds, county probation departments retain control of
designing and implementing the evidence-based programs as
they see fit. Pursuant to the CCPIA, probation must set up an
advisory committee, called the Community Corrections
Partnership, to advise in development and implementation of
evidence-based practices.223
The Community Corrections
Partnership is mandated to include a range of public safety
stakeholders, such as the presiding judge of the superior court,
the district attorney and public defender, the sheriff and chief of
police, representatives of county social services, mental health,
education, and employment, and a representative of victims.224
Thus, the CCPIA encourages the kind of community participation
and cooperation demonstrated to be an essential part of the
successful implementation of community corrections programs.
Finally, and critically both for the proper functioning of the
funding formula as well as for the successful implementation of
evidence-based practices, the CCPIA requires probation
departments to identify and track data and “outcome-based
measures.”225 This includes basic data such as the number of
adults on felony probation, the number of revocations to state
prison, the number of probationers successfully completing their
terms, the percentage of state moneys expended on evidence220
221
222
223
224
225

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3) (2010).
§ 1230(b)(3)(A).
§§ 1230(b)(3)(B)–(D).
§ 1230(b)(1).
§§ 1230(b)(1), 1230(b)(2)(A)–(M).
§ 1231(a).
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based programs, and the percentage of offenders supervised in
accordance with evidence-based practices.226 In order to facilitate
the accurate collection of data for the bill,227 the Legislature
passed a companion bill, S.B. 431, which requires an adult
probationer’s county of residence to facilitate the offender’s
supervision.228 This remedies the former practice whereby
probationers could be placed on probation in a county other than
where they resided, which created situations of duplicate
supervision or no supervision at all.229
Significantly, the CCPIA requires that counties reserve five
percent of funds to evaluate the effectiveness of their programs
and practices,230 thereby encouraging reliance on evidence and
outcome-based measures not only to implement programs, but
also to determine whether such programs are delivering the
desired outcomes. The bill also builds in some degree of state
oversight. Annually, probation departments must submit a
written report to the Administrative Office of the Courts and
CDCR evaluating the effectiveness of their programs.231 In turn,
the state agencies disbursing the funds must annually report to
the Governor and Legislature regarding statewide performancebased outcomes stemming from the CCPIA and “[t]he impact of
the moneys . . . to enhance public safety . . . .”232
In theory, therefore, the CCPIA incorporates many of the
best practices and recommendations of the various reports which
have addressed probation in California.
In particular, it
encourages a combination of surveillance and treatment for
probationers, the use of evidence-based risk and needs
assessment tools and practices, with critical evaluation of
program efficacy, and coordination and cooperation with the
community. It also seeks to address two of the problems inherent
in California’s decentralized probation model: lack of state
oversight and failure to collect data. Although the CCPIA retains
California’s county-based probation system, it does require
greater cooperation between state agencies and local entities as
far as data collection and funds disbursement. Ideally, this
would enable the state to monitor the overall effectiveness of the
programs and require some level of accountability from counties
without meddling too much in local affairs. Ultimately, the

226
227
228
229
230
231
232

§§ 1231(b)(1)–(4), 1231(d)(1)–(4).
Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184.
§ 1203.9.
Press Release, Mark Leno, supra note 198.
§ 1230(b)(4).
Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199, at F–G.
§ 1232.
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CCPIA represents a shift in perspective on adult probation: “For
a long time, adult probation was not seen as something that has
outcomes,” said Natalie Pearl, Research Director for San Diego
County Probation.233 “This bill is one of the first opportunities
we’ve had to get funding for adult services.”234
D. Focus on Public Safety and Startup Funds
While the CCPIA creates a new financial structure, it is
worthwhile to consider what the Act does not implement.235
First, the CCPIA does not alter the existing sentencing structure.
No crimes are re-categorized as requiring probation rather than
incarceration. Second, the CCPIA does not adopt Arizona’s
approach and thus does not provide probationers with the
possibility of shortening their sentences with earned-time credit.
Third, the CCPIA does not shift responsibility for probation to
the state: probation remains a local public safety program
receiving some state funds. And fourth, the CCPIA does not
itself provide startup funding for evidence-based programs.
Although the CCPIA does align with many policy-based
arguments, politics influenced what drafters ultimately decided
to include in the bill. Ms. Pank said that creating an earnedtime-credit provision or including any sentencing reform were
politically infeasible options.236 Sentencing reform, in particular,
is a dead issue in Sacramento. Since 1984, seven attempts to
create a statewide sentencing commission to evaluate and reform
California’s penal code have failed due to political opposition.237
In addition, CPOC and county probation departments did not
wish to cede control over probation to the state; and the CDCR
certainly did not have the political desire or capacity to assume
responsibility for even more offenders.238 According to Ms. Pank:
We were very clear that this was a delicate balance. We needed to
juxtapose this solution [to the prison crisis] with all the other
proposed solutions. We needed to show that this is not changing
sentencing; this is not a realignment of county programs to the
state . . . . If we had done anything that looked like a sentencing

233 Telephone interview with Natalie Pearl, Research Director, San Diego County
Probation (May 12, 2010).
234 Id.
235 See generally Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199.
236 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66.
237 Lauren E. Geissler, Creating and Passing a Successful Prison Reform Commission
in California 14 (Stanford Criminal Justice Ctr., Working Paper, 2006), available at
www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/scjc/workingpapers/LGeissler_06.pdf.
238 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66.
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change, that would have upset the political balance of this big piece of
legislation.239

Aware of the politics at play, those supporting S.B. 678
strategically emphasized public safety and fiscal outcomes,
rather than altering sentencing or diverting offenders who would
normally go to prison. Ms. Anderson explained that a focus on
diversion would have undermined efforts to pass the bill: “In
California, in order to get broad bipartisan support, that as a
goal was not going to get us where we wanted to go.”240 In the
Senate, the Committee on Public Safety told legislators that S.B.
678 would accomplish three goals: (1) reduce crime through
increased supervision of felony offenders; (2) reduce prison
overcrowding, “not by early release but by decreasing the
criminal activity of those already on felony probation;” and
(3) establish sustainable funding and save money for the state.241
Notably, rehabilitation, treatment, restorative justice, and
diversion are not listed among those three reasons.242
The strategic bipartisan focus on outcomes, combined with a
crisis situation, worked. S.B. 678 unanimously passed in the
Senate and the Assembly in September 2009.243 But, the passage
of the bill alone, without startup funds, would be problematic.
The failure of the 1994 Community Based Punishment Act
communicated an important lesson to the CCPIA’s sponsors.244
“S.B. 678 is really a great piece of legislation. It really sets up a
place to pivot the criminal justice system. But it wouldn’t work if
there wasn’t any startup money,” Ms. Pank said.245 Federal
funding offered a solution: the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 made stimulus funding available to
states for public safety projects.246 Through the Edward Byrne
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program, probation
departments are eligible for a portion of $44.5 million to jumpstart the implementation of evidence-based programs and

Id.
Telephone interview with Alison Anderson, supra note 184.
Bill Analysis, April, supra note 199, at R.
See id.
S.B. 678, Legis. Counsel’s Digest (Cal. Sept. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_678_bill_20090915_
enrolled.pdf.
244 See Hearing on S.B. 1069 Before the Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, 1995–1996
Sess. Current Bill Status (Cal. July 11, 1995) [hereinafter Hearing on S. B. 1069],
available
at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_1051-1100/sb_1069_bill_
20081204_status.html.
245 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66.
246 For information on the act, see Current Legislation: American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, SPEAKER NANCY PELOSI, http://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/
legislation?id=0273 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
239
240
241
242
243
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practices.247 The Legislature approved the one-time federal grant
funding as part of the 2009–2010 Budget Act, which also
reserved $424,000 for the Administrative Office of the Courts to
begin administering the CCPIA.248 With all the pieces thus in
place, the CCPIA is set to begin reforming the state of adult
felony probation in California.
IV. IMPLEMENTING S.B. 678
The passage of S.B. 678, while groundbreaking, is just the
beginning of the efforts to reform adult probation in California.
California’s own legislative history demonstrates that good
legislative work comprises only a small fraction of the battle.
The movement from planning to implementation can, and
undoubtedly will, pose unforeseen challenges. Data collection,
funding administration, the daily actions of probation officers—
all these areas and others open a myriad of potential pitfalls.
Moreover, probation has limited time to demonstrate the act’s
efficacy to legislators since the CCPIA sunsets in 2015.249 It is
therefore useful to take note of those areas which may pose
particular challenges to implementation.
If implementers
exercise caution and flexibility, the CCPIA could prove to be a
long-term success.
A. A Survey of County Plans
Beginning in 2010, probation departments will receive the
one-time JAG stimulus grants distributed over a period of three
years; the size of the grants, which total $44.5 million, are
proportionate to each county’s population of adults ages eighteen
to twenty-five years.250 Counties submitted applications for JAG
stimulus funds to the California Emergency Management Agency
(Cal EMA) in late 2009.251 These grant applications,
accompanying submissions to county supervisor boards, and
interviews with chief probation officers, provide details of
probation department plans for the implementation of the
CCPIA.252 A survey of the grant applications of seven diverse

See CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 217.
Bill Analysis, September, supra note 218, at 14.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1233.8 (2010).
CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 217, at 2.
251 Id. at 1.
252 Id. at 21. According to Cal EMA, the purpose of the grant program “is to provide
evidence-based supervision, programs, or services to adult felon probationers in an effort
to reduce the likelihood that they will commit new crimes or other violations and be sent
to prison.” Id. at cover letter. Although the Request for Application does not explicitly
mention the CCPIA, its goals, including collection of relevant data, are consistent with the
CCPIA; the legislative intent was to provide this grant to counties as startup funding
247
248
249
250
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counties, some Tier 1 (Stanislaus, San Diego, San Francisco,
Tulare), some Tier 2 (Riverside, Shasta, Fresno), some with very
large adult felony probation populations (San Diego: 21,940;
Riverside: 13,052) and other smaller (San Francisco: 4,733;
Shasta: 1,822) gives some indication of the immediate actions
probation departments are taking to implement evidence-based
practices.253 The grant applications and other sources show that
counties are beginning the process of hiring probation officers,
implementing risk/need assessments, and exploring options for
increasing evidence-based services and sanctions.
The Recovery Act requires grant recipients to demonstrate
that the funding helped retain or create jobs.254 As a result, all
counties applying for grants plan to hire new probation officers or
retain others that, due to budget cuts, might have otherwise been
let go.255 Given the high caseloads across counties,256 the
retention or addition of probation officers is indeed critical to the
success of any probation reform; moreover, implementing
evidence-based practices will likely require more time per
probationer than previously provided. For example, Tulare
County, which will receive a total of $635,044 over three years,
plans to use ninety-nine percent of grant funds to pay the salary
and benefits of four new probation officers.257 Tulare, currently
the sixth most poverty-stricken county in the United States with
a 14.9% unemployment rate, would not otherwise be able to
implement evidence-based practices: “Adult offenders in Tulare
County receive very few specialized services that assist them in
maintaining a crime-free lifestyle. Current adult supervision
probation caseloads average over 100 probationers per officer and
do not allow for intensive supervision services nor adequate
assessment of offender needs.”258

until the CCPIA’s incentive-based funding begins to be distributed. See Bill Analysis,
September, supra note 218, at 16.
253 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 30–31. Calculations of counties’
assignments to Tier 1 or Tier 2 are based on the Legislative Analyst’s Office provision of
revocation rates for 2005–2007, with an average statewide rate of 7.5%. Counties with
revocation rates under 9.375 (25% above 7.5) are Tier 1, while those with rates higher
than 9.375 are Tier 2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1233.2 (2010). See supra note 19 for an
evaluation of the accuracy of this data and rate calculations.
254 CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 217, at 13.
255 Id.
256 See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 7, at 30–31.
257 CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PROJECT SUMMARY FOR TULARE COUNTY,
EVIDENCE-BASED PROBATION SUPERVISION PROGRAM BUDGET NARRATIVE 1 (2009),
available at http://bosagendas.co.tulare.ca.us/MG307139/AS307142/AS307157/AI307312/
DO307414/DO_307414.pdf.
258 Id. at Project Summary § 8.
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Lowering caseloads is a goal even for the highest performing
counties, like San Francisco.259 Wendy Still, the San Francisco
Chief Adult Probation Officer, said that San Francisco will also
be adding a probation officer in an ongoing effort to lower
caseloads to eighty offenders per officer.260
In addition to adding staff, probation departments which
formerly did not use risk/needs assessment tools are spending
JAG funds to purchase and implement these. For example, Tier
2 counties Fresno, Riverside, and Shasta each lacked an
assessment tool prior to 2010.261 Fresno County will use part of
its $1.3 million grant funding to implement the use of an
assessment tool to help determine “what interventions would
best address the offender’s risk of reoffending and thus returning
to prison.”262 Sparsely populated Shasta County will use a
portion of its $37,353 grant to participate along with fifteen other
counties in the development of an assessment tool.263
Many counties are also planning to expand evidence-based
services for probationers; a task that is possible only through
increases in staffing and the use of risk/needs assessment tools.
San Francisco intends to implement a pilot program targeted at
felony probationers ages eighteen to twenty-five; and, in addition
to higher levels of supervision, probationers who fall into this
category will have increased access to services in four target
areas: substance abuse, housing, education, and employment.264
Wendy Still explained that the idea is to show that the program
works for this target group, and thereafter it will expand
outward to the rest of the probation population using CCPIA
funds.265 Since San Francisco will likely fall within the small
pool of counties eligible for the high performance grants, Ms. Still
said she will select whichever calculation—Tier 1 or high
Telephone interview with Wendy Still, supra note 65.
Id.
See CNTY. OF RIVERSIDE PROB. DEP’T, SUBMITTAL TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE 2 (2009), available at www.clerkoftheboard.co.riverside.ca.us/
agendas/2009/12_22_2009/03.39.pdf; FRESNO CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, AGENDA ITEM
38: EVIDENCE BASED PROBATION SUPERVISION PROGRAM WITH THE CALIFORNIA
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (2010) [hereinafter FRESNO CNTY. BD.
OF SUPERVISORS], available at http://www2.co.fresno.ca.us/0110a/Questys_Agenda/
MG173545/AS173576/AS173593/AI173734/DO173735/DO_173735.pdf; SIERRA CNTY. BD.
OF SUPERVISORS, AGENDA ITEM 4: AUTHORIZATION TO APPLY FOR A RECOVERY JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) THROUGH CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
(CAL EMA) (2009) [hereinafter SIERRA CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS], available at
http://www.sierracounty.ws/county_docs/bos/BOS%20DECEMBER%2015%202009/121520
09%20BOS%20PKT.pdf.
262 FRESNO CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, supra note 261, at 2.
263 SIERRA CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, supra note 261.
264 Interview with Wendy Still, supra note 65.
265 Id.
259
260
261
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performance—will provide more money.266 In San Diego, roughly
$2 million of the county’s $3.4 million in stimulus funding will go
toward accepting contract bids from community providers of
direct services.267 Although San Diego is a Tier 1 county with a
large adult felony probation population, Natalie Pearl said the
right types of services are not currently available to
probationers.268 In particular, she said, San Diego will be looking
for carefully tailored contract proposals for cognitive behavioral
services, substance abuse treatment, and vocational and
educational training.269
Several counties, including Stanislaus, Fresno, and Tulare,
are intending to combine access to services with increased
supervision through the creation of targeted day reporting
centers.270 All three counties will assign probationers to high
supervision caseloads based on the outcome of assessment tools.
Stanislaus, for example, is specifying intensive supervision for
approximately fifty medium-to-high risk eighteen to twenty-five
year-old felony probationers.271 Day reporting centers place
probation officers under the same roof as services, allowing a
one-stop shop for daily interactions with probation officers, drug
testing, job training, housing assistance, peer support groups,
and other services.272
Finally, both San Diego and Stanislaus intend to increase
probationer accountability through implementing sanction
models in which offenders receive immediate hearings and
escalating sanctions for any violations.273 Stanislaus, in addition
to increasing services through a day reporting center, will
emulate an evidence-based program in Hawaii called HOPE
(Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement).274 Through
the use of unscheduled drug testing and the threat of immediate,
short-term jail sentences (“flash incarceration”), HOPE has
demonstrated success in significantly decreasing positive drug

Id.
Telephone interview with Natalie Pearl, supra note 233.
Id.
Id.
BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF THE CNTY. OF STANISLAUS, ACTION AGENDA SUMMARY,
APPROVAL TO ACCEPT AN EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT FROM
THE CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (2010); CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY, PROJECT SUMMARY FOR TULARE COUNTY, supra note 257; FRESNO CNTY. BD. OF
SUPERVISORS, supra note 261.
271 BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF THE CNTY. OF STANISLAUS, supra note 270, at 3.
272 Id.
273 Telephone interview with Natalie Pearl, supra note 233; BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF
THE CNTY. OF STANISLAUS, supra note 271, at 3.
274 BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF THE CNTY. OF STANISLAUS, supra note 270, at 3.
266
267
268
269
270
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tests and lowering arrest rates among probationers.275 Ms. Pearl
said that San Diego is looking at a similar model used in Houston
and hopes to create a program tailored to San Diego’s resources
and needs.276
B. Potential Challenges for Implementation
The statewide implementation of the CCPIA is underway
and so far appears to be conforming to the intent of legislators.
However, there are already several areas of concern for
implementation which probation departments and state
administrations should carefully consider: county budget
shortfalls; the need for extensive training; and the omission of
concrete incentives for probationers.
First, while the CCPIA guarantees some funding from the
state once the initiative is up and running—that is, once counties
can show results—but before those results develop, counties
must depend on the stimulus grants and county funds. While the
JAG grants are a positive development, federal funds may not be
enough to provide the needed startup money.277 Unfortunately,
the CCPIA asks probation departments to develop greater
supervision and resources at a time when many counties face
severe budget cuts.278 For example, Tulare County cut its
Probation Department’s budget by 6.03% in FY 2009–2010,
freezing some salaries and instituting a mandatory furlough.279
Stanislaus intends to implement a “flash incarceration” system,
but the Sheriff’s Department is closing two hundred fifty beds
due to budget cuts.280
And, San Francisco Mayor Gavin
Newsome told agencies, including probation, to submit reports
anticipating worst-case scenario budget cuts of ten to twenty
percent.281 Karen Pank said that with all of the budget cuts, “I’m
concerned that $45 million of start-up funding won’t go as far as
we had hoped.”282 That would leave probation departments
without the funds necessary to implement the programs and
275 ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, RESEARCH BRIEF: EVALUATION OF HOPE
PROBATION (2008) available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/
HOPE_Research_Brief.pdf. See also Mark Schoofs, Scared Straight . . . by Probation,
WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121685255149978873.html.
276 Telephone interview with Natalie Pearl, supra note 233.
277 See Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66.
278 Id.
279 CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, PROJECT SUMMARY FOR TULARE COUNTY, supra
note 257, at Project Summary § 8.
280 Telephone interview with Jerry Powers, supra note 85.
281 Matt Smith, DA: Further Newsom Budget Cuts Would Lead to ‘Surrender the
Safety of Our Streets’, S.F. WKLY. BLOG (Mar. 8, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/
thesnitch/2010/03/before_ag_endorsement_kamala_h.php.
282 Telephone interview with Karen Pank, supra note 66.
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practices needed to begin fulfilling the CCPIA’s revocationreduction objective.283 Moreover, for less populous counties, the
stimulus grants may not be enough to cover the costs of
assessment tools and data management systems.284 As a result,
Ms. Pank said she would not be surprised if some smaller
counties decide that it is not cost effective for them to partake in
the CCPIA program at all.285
Funding issues aside, the mere implementation of evidencebased practices and programs alone, without ongoing training
and monitoring of probation officers and staff, will accomplish
little. As the National Institute for Corrections admonishes,
“[i]mplementing evidence-based policy and practice is not a
simple task; it requires a fundamental change in the way
community corrections does business, and a shift in the
philosophies of those doing this work.”286 Turning theory into
practice can backfire if program components are altered or
ignored due to political pressure or shoddy training: “Those
interested in translating the ‘what works’ literature into
operational programs must make certain that the programs are
implemented fully and coherently, not dismantled or watered
down through the political process in ways that undermine their
effectiveness.”287
Wendy Still agrees that, even in high-performing San
Francisco, instituting best practices is slow work which requires
training.288 “We have a long way to go,” she said.289 “There are
cultures that have to change within institutions.”290 However,
the text of the CCPIA does not mention probation staff
training.291 And while the act requires departments to reserve
some funds for the evaluation of programs,292 this back-end focus
misses critical work that must be done at the front end. The
California Public Defenders Association, which opposed S.B. 678,
criticized the bill for “presuppos[ing] that each Probation
Department is a clinically trained treatment provider.”293
Id.
Id.
Id.
CRIME & JUSTICE INST. & NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 128, at xv.
Robert Weisberg & Joan Petersilia, The Dangers of Pyrrhic Victories Against Mass
Incarceration, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 124, 132.
288 Interview with Wendy Still, supra note 65.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 S.B. 678, Legis. Counsel’s Digest 92 (Cal. Sept. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_678_bill_20090915_
enrolled.pdf.
292 Id.
293 Bill Analysis, June, supra note 168, at 19.
283
284
285
286
287
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Indeed, in San Diego, Natalie Pearl predicts that the largest
challenge for implementation of the CCPIA will be insuring that
all probation officers and staff are properly using the evidencebased methods: “I see the major challenge as fidelity to the
evidence based practice knowledge. I don’t think most of us
really understand what [constant and careful following of EBP]
means . . . . Unless you maintain integrity to that model, it won’t
reduce recidivism.”294
As a result, San Diego is taking the training of its officers
seriously. As part of the its grant funding, the county will be
collaborating with the University of California, San Diego to
provide two days of training per month for its line officers.295
Although San Diego already uses a risk/needs assessment, Ms.
Pearl said training will focus on the “needs” half of the
equation.296 Officers will learn how to better manage cases and
motivate offenders to change.297 Proper implementation will call
for a shift in officer attitude from an all-enforcement mentality to
a mixture of supervision and social work.298 Unless other
counties likewise devote resources to training, the theory behind
evidence-based practices will likely fail to produce real outcomes
when implemented.299
In addition to failing to mention or build in resources for
training, the Legislature opted to refrain from including earnedtime credits for probationers who follow court orders and
participate in programming.
The possibility of shortened
probation terms for good behavior would provide probationers
with positive incentives to alter their criminal conduct. The
California Public Defenders Association criticized S.B. 678 for
this omission and suggested that it include incentives for
probationers “including, but not limited to, reduction in the
length of probation supervision.”300 Although conceivably the
CCPIA could reduce revocations without such incentives, this
situation has not been tested. Arizona’s early success appears to
be largely the result of the earned-time credit provision.301
Moreover, the experience of drug courts and other evidence-based
Telephone interview with Natalie Pearl, supra note 233.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
299 The implementation of Kansas’ RRI is a good example of the amount of training
and leadership needed to help evidence-based practices work in reality. The Department
of Corrections has engaged in extensive and ongoing training of probation agency staff.
See KAN. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 161, at 4–5.
300 Bill Analysis, June, supra note 168, at 21.
301 ARIZ. ADULT PROB., PROBATION REVOCATION & CRIME REDUCTION REPORT FY
2009, supra note 165, at 4, 7.
294
295
296
297
298
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programs indicates that “positive reinforcement for good behavior
is often critical for producing long-term behavioral
improvement,” especially for individuals with long histories of
coercive interactions with the law.302 Of course, judges are
already enabled by law to reduce probation terms,303 so probation
departments do not need an act to recommend a term reduction
to judges. Wendy Still said San Francisco intends to do just that
if a probationer is doing well on probation and participating in
programs.304 In fact, positive incentives need not be limited to a
reduction in probation time, but could be as simple as positive
feedback from a figure of authority, such as a judge, or
recognition at a graduation ceremony, as occurs in drug court.
That said, positive incentives of this ilk only work if the
probationer is aware of them ex ante, and they are dependent on
the involvement of a judge in the oversight of a probationer’s
case.
The success of the CCPIA might very well depend on
probation’s proactive outreach to county judges. Judges have the
power not only to decide whether to sentence offenders to
probation in the first place, but also to determine the conditions
of probation.305 Judges can set goals for the offender, shorten
probation terms, and show lenience if an offender violates the
terms of his probation.306 Judges also have the influence to draw
together justice system actors such as prosecutors and defenders,
thus proving an important ally in the creation of community
cooperation and motivation. In fact, Little Hoover Commission
recommended that judges should be empowered to “oversee the
progress of the offenders in the assigned community
sanctions.”307 The Public Defender Association likewise agreed
that “intensive judicial supervision will enhance public safety
and increase positive outcomes for a great number of [probation
program] participants.”308 While the CCPIA does include the
chief judge of the county superior court on the Community
302 NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE-BASED
SENTENCING & OTHER COURT DISPOSITIONS FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSING INDIVIDUALS 4
(2009), available at http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/NADCP%20Principles%
20of%20Evidence-Based%20Sentencing.pdf.
303 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.3(a) (2010) (“The court shall have authority at any time
during the term of probation to revoke, modify, or change its order of suspension of
imposition or execution of sentence. The court may at any time when the ends of justice
will be subserved thereby, and when the good conduct and reform of the person so held on
probation shall warrant it, terminate the period of probation, and discharge the person so
held.”).
304 Interview with Wendy Still, supra note 65.
305 See § 1203.
306 Id.
307 LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 84, at 32.
308 Bill Analysis, June, supra note 168, at 21.
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Corrections Partnership committee,309 probation departments
ought to make a concerted effort to obtain buy-in and active
support for local judges whether or not they decide to provide
offenders with positive incentives.
CONCLUSION
After twenty years of neglect, California’s adult probationers
are finally receiving the legislative attention this high-risk, highneeds population desperately needs. If implemented properly,
California’s S.B. 678, the Community Corrections Performance
Incentives Act, could represent a sea-change in how the
California justice system engages with low-level offenders. In
large part, the CCPIA is a well-crafted piece of legislation which
incorporates expert recommendations and lessons learned from
failed projects.
By providing sustainable funding tied to
probation departments’ implementation of evidence-based
practices, the CCPIA seeks to realign the fiscal relationship
between counties and the state and to reverse the adverse
incentive structure which leads counties to incarcerate rather
than rehabilitate. So far, counties that have begun to implement
the CCPIA appear to be adhering to legislative intent; but
implementation will likely prove difficult. In order to ensure the
success of the CCPIA, probation departments should devote
adequate resources to staff training, provide positive incentives
for probationers, and reach out to judges and other justice system
actors. Furthermore, the state and the counties should demand
accountability of one another and annual reports evaluating
outcomes should be read and then acted upon. Like any longterm project, the CCPIA will require some short-term investment
in order to produce benefits down the road.

309

Bill Analysis, September, supra note 218, at 3.

